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Abstract
The ability to enforce usage policies attached to data in a ﬁne grained manner requires that the system
be able to trace and control the ﬂow of information within it. This paper presents the design and im-
plementation of such an information ﬂow control system, named Trishul, as a Java Virtual Machine. In
particular we address the problem of tracing implicit information ﬂow, which had not been resolved by
previous run-time systems and the additional intricacies added on by the Java architecture. We argue that
the security beneﬁts oﬀered by Trishul are substantial enough to counter-weigh the performance overhead
of the system as shown by our experiments.
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1 Introduction
Ensuring the conﬁdentiality of medical, legal, ﬁnancial, business and other data
is becoming increasingly important. Individual data items may have very speciﬁc
redistribution policies, such as a medical record intended “only for doctors at this
hospital whose patient is John Smith” or “only for employees of the marketing
department.” Current systems do not do a very good job of enforcing detailed
and data-speciﬁc information ﬂow policies. In this paper we describe the design
and implementation of an architecture that can be used to enforce data-speciﬁc
information ﬂow policies that are more ﬁne grained than what is currently possible.
As an example consider an email infrastructure in a corporate environment where
the email sender wishes to enforce email policies like ‘do not forward’ without having
to trust email application running on the recipient’s system. Mobile agent systems
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provide another scenario. The agents carry data with them whose integrity and
conﬁdentiality is important to the security of the system. External nodes that
execute the agent code and handle agent data should not be able to use them in a
manner that will subvert their usage policy.
Our general approach to solving the problem is via the implementation of a
virtual environments whose task it is to track the ﬂow of the data within the re-
mote system and enable the enforcement of policy decisions. Such a mechanism,
often termed information ﬂow control (IFC), relies on the ability to track and con-
trol the ﬂow of information without knowing any of the details of the (untrusted)
application’s inner working or actions. In this paper we report the design and im-
plementation of such an IFC system within a virtual machine environment, named
Trishul. In order to make this design secure, the initiating entity needs a way to
verify that the virtual environment running on the remote machine is the one it
expects and trusts. We believe that Remote Attestation [1] provides such a mech-
anism and will assume that such a mechanism is available and will not discuss this
aspect further. We also do not deal with the issue of information leaks through
certain covert/side channels attacks like resource usage and timing attacks in our
work.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, after discussing the
approaches various approaches towards implementing a secure ﬂow tracing system,
we present our proposal for handling information ﬂows. We present the details
of Trishul’s implementation in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the results of
performance measurement tests conducted using Trishul. In Section 5 we discuss
some issues related to the performance, security and usability of the system and in
6 we examine related work in this ﬁeld. We conclude in Section 7 by summarizing
the key points of our work and point towards future work.
2 Information Flows
2.1 Explicit and Implicit Flows
Many programs compute values using one or more variables as operands and store
these values into another variable. For example, in the pseudo-code y = x, when
the value of x is transferred to y, information is said to ﬂow from object (variable)
x to object (variable) y and the ﬂow can denoted as x⇒ y [2].
boolean x
boolean y
i f ( x == true )
y = true
else
y = fa l se
Listing 1: Implicit ﬂow code 1
boolean b = fa l se
boolean c = fa l se
i f ( ! a )
c = true
i f ( ! c )
b = true
Listing 2: Implicit ﬂow code 2
Flows due to codes like y = x are termed explicit ﬂows because the the ﬂow takes
place due to the explicit transfer of a value from x to y. On the other hand, consider
the code shown in Listing 1. Even though there is no direct transfer of value from x
to y, once the code is executed, y would have obtained the value of x. We say that
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in this case, x ⇒ y was an implicit ﬂow. In order to capture this implicit ﬂow of
information, Trishul uses the concept of a context taint, which extends the idea of
associating a security class with the program counter pc [3]. It aims to capture the
implicit taint labels associated with a code branch, for example a case in a switch or
an if/else, by examining the variables that eﬀect the conditional branch and then
passing this context taint into the branch. Thus, for an if control ﬂow instruction
(CFI) like if (a == 5) && (b == 6) the context taint ct is computed as ct = a⊕b,
where a denotes the security label associated with the object a.
A trickier implicit ﬂow is shown in Listing 2. When a is true, the ﬁrst if fails
so c remains L, where L is the default lowest possible security class in the system.
The next if succeeds and b = pc = c = L. Thus, at the end of the run, b attains
the value of a, but b = a. The same is true when a is false. The fundamental
problem is that even though the ﬁrst branch is not taken, the very fact that it is
not followed contains information, which is then leaked using the next if .
In order to capture these classes of implicit information ﬂows, we try to identify
all objects that are modiﬁed within the branch blocks. To this end, a list of the
objects that are modiﬁed in each block is calculated. When a conditional CFI is
executed the objects that are modiﬁed in any of the possible paths are tainted with
the context taint ct using the following rule:
• If the branch is taken: object = ct⊕ explicit f low in statement
• If the branch is not taken: object = object⊕ ct
Let us consider an example using the pseudo-code in Listing 2. The analysis at
load time computes the ct at line 03 (ct 03) as a and ct 05 = c. Assume a = false.
Table 1 summarises the actions taken at run-time by the IFC system.
Line number Is it a branch Is branch taken? Taint computation
03 yes yes none (since branch is taken)
04 no - c = L ⊕ ct 03 = a
05 yes no b = b⊕ ct 05 = b⊕ c = a
Table 1
Branch context taint rule example
We see that this approach correctly identiﬁes implicit ﬂow of information from a
to b by successfully computing b = a. A similar result is computed when a = true.
2.2 Managing Information Flow
In general, two diﬀerent approaches have been explored with the aim of providing
information ﬂow control - compile time and run time.
In the compile-time approach, applications are written in specially designed
programming languages in which special annotations are used to attach security
labels and constraints to the objects in the program. At compile time, the compiler
uses these extra labels to ensure the security of the ﬂow control model. x can ﬂow
to y, denoted by x → y, iﬀ information in x is allowed to ﬂow into y [2]. In the
context of information ﬂow, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a system to
be considered secure is that, for all (x, y), x⇒ y is allowed iﬀ x→ y [4].
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Run-time solutions take a diﬀerent approach by using the labels as extra prop-
erty of the object and tracking their propagation as the objects are involved in
computation. Instead of verifying x ⊕ y → z at compile time, the system prop-
agates the security class of the information source into the information receiving
object. Thus, the assignment z = x ⊕ y occurs. These assignments however only
track the ﬂow of information as it moves through the system. The actual enforce-
ment of security policies is carried out by another part of the system, hereby termed
the ‘policy engine’. It intercepts all information ﬂows from program objects (such
as variables) to output channels, and allows the ﬂow to proceed only if they are
not disallowed by the relevant policies. Examples of such output channels are ﬁles,
shared memories, network writes etc. Whenever an object x tries to write informa-
tion into an output channel O, the policy engine checks whether x→ O is allowed
by the speciﬁed policy and if not, the ﬂow is disallowed.
Compile-time system suﬀer from the limitation on the kind of policies than can
be enforced by it. Since the policies are bound to the code in a static manner early in
the life-cycle, these systems cannot be used in application scenarios where the policy
is bound, not to the application, but instead to the data. These systems also cannot
enforce policies that depend on the dynamic run-time properties of the system. Pure
run-time systems on the other hand are not able to handle implicit ﬂow leaks due
to their inability to analyse ﬂows associated with unexecuted branches, as shown in
Listing 2. Trishul uses a hybrid approach, as explained later on, whereby a static
analysis of the Java bytecode is performed at class load time in order to evaluate
and capture as much of the implicit ﬂow as possible. Later on, when the code is
executed, the actual ﬂow of taints is traced. Trishul is thus able to make use of the
dynamic run-time properties of the system to enforce wider class of policies.
3 Implementing Trishul
Run-time information ﬂow control systems can be implemented at several diﬀerent
abstract levels within a computer architecture. Implementing it at the application
level, ties down the system to a speciﬁc application. Implementing it within the
operating system, as in HiStar [5], allows the operating system to enforce control
information ﬂow between kernel objects, like threads, address space and devices.
However, such an implementation will ﬁnd it very diﬃcult to translate application
level usage policies into OS system calls due to the semantic gap between the two
levels. Another aspect to be considered is that the process of tracing information
ﬂow at run-time involves having to dynamically trace access to stacks, registers,
program counter and memory.
With these design considerations in mind, application virtual machines stands
out as an obvious middleware platform choice for implementing Trishul. The in-
terpreted nature of these systems make it particularly suitable for implementing
run-time ﬂow analysis. Java virtual machine (JVM), being one of the most widely
deployed virtual machine environment around, was chosen for implementing Trishul.
When a piece of data, with a policy attached to it, is used by an application that
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runs within Trishul, it is tainted with a security label. In order to implement this,
Trishul adds hooks in order to intercept calls from the application to Java library
methods that brings data into the JVM. In the complete architecture of Trishul,
a pluggable policy engine module speciﬁes which of these methods are of interest
to the engine and hence need to be intercepted. Similarly, the engine also speciﬁes
which output channels are protected and which of the associated method calls need
to be intercepted. A comprehensive treatment of the actual implementation of this
pluggable policy engine module and the language for writing the policy engine is
beyond the scope of this paper and is merely mentioned in Section 5. Instead, this
paper focuses on the implementation of the core information tracing mechanism of
Trishul based on version 1.1.7 of the Kaﬀe JVM.
3.1 Java Architecture
The Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is an abstract computer which loads the class
ﬁles produced by the Java compiler and executes the bytecode contained in them
in a platform-dependent manner. Even though Java architecture provides a level of
built-in policy-based security [6], the supported policies cannot be expressed at the
granularity or semantics we are interested in.
Trishul was initially implemented in the interpreted mode of the Kaﬀe JVM [7]
wherein each bytecode instruction is executed one at a time, as a proof of con-
cept. The alternate just-in-time mode, which provides much better performance, is
currently in the process of being implemented.
An interpreted JVM has three distinct parts (1) the class loader which is respon-
sible for loading classes and interfaces and performing associated security checks;
(2) the execution engine which executes each bytecode instruction; and (3) the run-
time data area. The runtime data area consists of a method area, heap, Java stacks,
native method stacks and a program counter register. Each Java application is run
inside a separate virtual machine. The method area and the heap are shared across
all threads running in a JVM. Each Java stack is made up of frames, with each
frame containing the state of a separate Java method invocation. In interpreter
mode, Kaﬀe JVM uses the variables array to hold the local variable values and the
operand stack to hold intermediate operation results.
The VM executes the instructions by moving data from the local variable array
to the operand stack or vice versa and performing computation on these values in
the operand stack using it also to store intermediate values. In order for the virtual
machine to track the ﬂow of information as the instructions are executed, every slot
on the variable array as well as the operand stack has to be extended to store the
label of the information that is stored in the slot.
3.2 Stack, Heap and Object Taints
In order to implement taint labels on the objects, the stack structure has to be
extended. In Kaﬀe each stack is implemented as a set of slots. Trishul extends
the struct that implements the slot in order to hold the taint information. As in
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the original slot implementation, the memory allocation is handled automatically
by Kaﬀe’s stack management functions. However, taint propagation has to be
instrumented separately as Kaﬀe copies members of stack slots rather than the
structures as a whole. The taint propagation mechanism was added by extending
the macros used by Kaﬀe to implement the Java instruction set. In addition to
the stack, Java object members and array elements also need to be be tainted.
Therefore they are extended to include a taint label for each member variable.
3.3 Context Taints
To handle implicit ﬂows, the system must know how the control ﬂow inﬂuences the
information ﬂow. To determine this, a control ﬂow graph (CFG) is created when
a method is analyzed, as in Figure 1. After the ﬁrst basic block, the control ﬂow
branches into two diﬀerent paths, representing the if/else statement in the source
code in Listing 3, whose bytecode representation is shown in Listing 4. In the branch
that is executed, the context taint must include the taints on the condition used
in the if-statement. After the branches merge, at pc 13, the if statement no longer
inﬂuences the ﬂow of control, so the condition’s taint should no longer be included
in the context taint.
This information is speciﬁed in the context bitmap (shown in the bottom left
section in the CFG). Each basic block has such a bitmap, which contains a single
bit per conditional CFI. If the bit is set, execution of the basic block is inﬂuenced by
that CFI, so its condition’s taint must be included in the context taint whenever the
basic block is executed. To this end, an array of partial context taints is maintained,
which has an element for each conditional CFI. Whenever the condition is evaluated,
the appropriate element in the array is updated with the condition’s taint. When
a new basic block is executed, the context taint is reconstructed by including only
those elements of the partial taint array whose bit is set in the bitmap.
boolean a = true ;
boolean b ;
i f ( a )
{
b = true ;
}
else
{
b = fa l se ;
}
Listing 3: Java code for CFG example
00 : i c o n s t 1
01 : i s t o r e 1
02 : i l o a d 1
03 : i f e q 11
06 : i c o n s t 1
07 : i s t o r e 2
08 : goto 13
11 : i c o n s t 0
12 : i s t o r e 2
13 : r e turn
Listing 4: Bytecode of Listing 3
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10
1
iconst_0
istore_2
WRITES
local_2
11−12
1
01
local_2
WRITESiconst_1istore_2
?goto
6−10
0
11
13−13
?return
11
EXIT
local_1
WRITE[00]
[0] ?ifeq
0−5
iload_1
iconst_1
istore_1
Fig. 1: Control-ﬂow graph created from Listing 4
To actually determine which con-
ditional CFIs inﬂuences the execu-
tion of a basic block, a dataﬂow anal-
ysis is used. Whenever there is a
branch in the CFG, each outgoing
path is tagged with a diﬀerent value.
After the dataﬂow analysis, the ﬁrst
node where all the tags are set, is
the node where all execution paths
merge. In the CFG, the center left
section shows the tags for this analysis. In the context bitmap, the bit for the con-
dition CFI is set in the basic blocks where the paths have branched, but not not
yet merged.
3.4 Fallback mechanism
In some cases it cannot be determined which variables are modiﬁed in a branch
before the branch is actually executed, either because it depends on information
that is only available at run-time or because the analysis is not rigorous enough. To
ensure that no information is leaked, we use a conservative fallback mechanism, a
global taint, gt. This global taint is always used in computing the context taint (ct
= ct ⊕ gt). Whenever the variables modiﬁed within a branch cannot be determined,
the branch’s context taint is included in global taint, ensuring that any later uses
of the variables in the non-taken branch will be tainted with the branch’s context
taint. Of course, as the global context taint is not untainted reset, it must be
untainted manually to avoid label creep [8]. In Trishul, the policy engine is tasked
with explicitly untainting the global taint.
Trishul is able to track all accesses to local variables, temporaries and stack
variables, and in a lot of cases object members. The system cannot track object
members accesses if the object’s ‘this’ pointer cannot be determined at the time
of analysis. We are actively considering how to improve our load-time analysis to
reduce the number of times the fallback mechanism is invoked and thereby the label
creep. A way to do this would be to contain the scope of the fallback mechanism,
for example by limiting it to a method’s block. This would be safe if it can be
determined that all values that should be tainted will be overwritten before the
method returns. We are also considering to allow for annotations to optionally
disable the fallback mechanism within Trishul. This could help avoid label creep
in cases where our analysis fails but no information is actually being leaked. Of
course, these annotations must be used very carefully to avoid information leaks,
and therefore they can only be speciﬁed within the trusted policy engine.
3.5 Exception handling
As exceptions can cause changes in the control ﬂow, they require special handling
to avoid leaking information. In Java there are two kinds of exceptions: normal ex-
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ceptions and run-time exceptions. A normal exceptions must be handled explicitly,
either by containing the oﬀending throw instruction in an appropriate ‘catch’ block,
or by declaring it as part of the method’s signature. Run-time exceptions are used
to signal internal errors that may not be recoverable, such as dereferencing a null
pointer or division by zero. Exception handling in the JVM is identical for normal
and run-time exceptions, but the fact that run-time exceptions are not declared
makes their analysis harder, as does the fact that most instructions can cause a
run-time exception. Because these instructions are so common and the likelihood
of a run-time exception is very low, tainted run-time exceptions may be treated as
an abnormal event, causing the program to terminate. In this case, they can be
disregarded in the exception analysis.
A throw statement will transfer control to the appropriate catch block. This
is like a goto statement, with the diﬀerence that the target address may be in
a diﬀerent method if the throw statement is not inside an appropriate try/catch
block. Also, unlike a goto statement which always has a ﬁxed target address, the
target of a throw statement may not be known before run-time, since an exception
that is thrown is just a normal object that resides on the heap, the parameter to
the throw instruction is a reference to that object. Before run-time, only the static
type of the reference can be determined. The actual type of the exception object
may be a subclass of that type. As the catch block that is invoked depends on the
actual type of the exception object, the catch block may not be known before the
throw statement is actually executed. Also note that if the exception is thrown to
a diﬀerent method, it is generally not possible to determine the catch block before
run-time, as that would require knowledge of each possible call site.
In our approach, best eﬀort is made to determine the run-time type of the
exception object, using a simple analysis that tries to ﬁnd the instruction that
places the reference to the exception on the stack. If this is a new instruction
(which it frequently is), the run-time type is known. If the run-time type is known,
and there is an appropriate catch block, an edge is added in the CFG from the throw
statement to the catch block. In other cases, an edge is added to the method’s exit
block. This errs on the side of caution as it assumes no catch block will be executed,
the variables written in any of the catch blocks will be tainted, possibly triggering
the fallback mechanism.
Method invocations also require special care in the light of exceptions. If a
method can throw an exception, the ﬂow of control will not necessarily pass to the
instruction following the method invocation, but may instead pass to a catch block
or the caller of the method. This turns a method into a conditional CFI. If run-
time exceptions are treated as normal exceptions, each instruction that can cause
a run-time exception also becomes a conditional CFI. In the CFG, a method that
can throw an exception is treated as a CFI with an edge to the next basic block,
as well as an edge to each catch block that may be invoked, or the exit block if a
catch block cannot be determined. There can be multiple such edges, as a method
may declare diﬀerent distinct exception types.
If an exception is thrown, the current context taint and the exception’s taint
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are stored. At the catch block, this taint is included in the local context taint; each
catch block has a bit in the context bitmap and thus an entry in the context taint for
this purpose. If the catch block is not in the same method as the throw instruction,
the call stack will be unwound. Each method invocation on the stack is treated as a
conditional CFI, which requires tainting variables that are written to in the current
stack frame, as the instructions following the method invocation are analogous to
control path that is not executed. As the stack will be unwound anyway, tainting
local variables and stack elements is not required. The entire unwinding of the stack
can be skipped if neither the exception nor the context were tainted.
Information can be leaked if a method that declares an exception does not throw
such an exception, much like an if-statement can leak information by not executing
a certain control path. Consider Listing 5:
boolean b = true ;
try {
l eak ( s e c r e t ) ;
b = fa l se ;
}
catch ( Exception e ) {}
void l eak (boolean s e c r e t ) throws Exception
{
i f ( s e c r e t ) throw new Exception ( ) ;
}
Listing 5: Information leak through Exceptions
In this case, the fact that the exception is not thrown conveys the fact that
secret is false. Therefore, the assignment to b must also be tainted. This is handled
by maintaining in leak a taint of exceptions that are not thrown. When the method
executes, each conditional CFI that skips executing of a throw statement causes the
context taint to be included in this taint. As the invocation of leak is considered to
be a conditional CFI, it has a bit in the context bitmap and an entry in the context
taint. This entry is set to leak’s non-thrown taint, which will ensure the assignment
to b is tainted. Note that after the catch block, the control paths merge, so the
context taint is declassiﬁed.
‘Finally’ blocks, which are executed when leaving a try/catch block regardless
of whether an exception is thrown, are implemented in Java as catch blocks for any
type of exception. The case when no exception is thrown is handled by an explicit
jump into the ﬁnally block. Therefore our approach is able to handle these blocks
automatically.
3.6 Methods and Fields
When a method is invoked, the context taint is passed to that method along with
any taints on the parameter values. This ensures that taints will not be lowered
simply by invoking another method. When the method returns, the return value’s
taint is propagated back and the context taint is restored, as the calling method
does not depend on any conditional CFIs in the method that stopped executing.
Taint values are stored separately for diﬀerent ﬁelds in an object, avoiding label
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1 2 3
Kaﬀe 3.53 6.09 8.95
Trishul 4.56 7.89 11.55
% overhead 29.18 29.56 29.05
Table 2
AllObjectConstruct (large assign) in μs
256 512 1K 2K 4K 8K 16K 32K
Kaﬀe 47.57 74.86 113.68 135.77 147.95 170.39 190.08 193.37
Trishul 44.29 71.78 109.56 130.9 145.42 168.46 189.22 192.7
% overhead 6.89 4.11 3.62 3.59 1.71 1.13 0.45 0.35
Table 3
FileWriteBW in MB/s for various block sizes
creep. Each object also has an collective object taint, which automatically includes
any taint value written to any of its members. This allows a policy to quickly check
if any part of an object is tainted. The policy can also set or reset this taint value.
4 Performance
In this section we brieﬂy look at the performance overhead introduced by the taint
propagation mechanism. This overhead can be attributed to, among other things,
the analysis of the CFGs, the calculation of the context taints and the creation
and maintenance of the taint properties of the objects. The experiments were
conducted on an Intel Pentium M processor 1.60GHz machine with 512MB RAM,
running Ubuntu 6.10 with a 2.6.17-10-generic SMP Linux kernel. Version 1.1.7 of
the Kaﬀe JVM was used for the comparison 1 .
Table 2 summarises the result of the ‘AllObjectConstruct (large assign)’ mi-
crobenchmark from the jMocha benchmark suite [9] which records the time taken
to construct objects and initialise all local variables. The three values are for vary-
ing number of initialisations. The test reﬂects the overhead introduced mainly by
the creation of the CFGs and the creation and initialisation of the taint labels to
their default values. As this benchmark measures only the initialisation time, which
forms a very small part of the full runtime, the observed overhead is justiﬁable.
256 512 1K 2K 4K 8K 16K 32K
Kaﬀe 68.33 116.48 154.5 208.19 273.99 343.24 386.52 419.01
Trishul 65.05 111.77 148.25 201.06 271.05 340.48 386.38 418.6
% overhead 4.8 4.04 4.05 3.42 1.07 0.8 0.04 0.1
Table 4
jMocha benchmark, FileReadBW in MB/s for various block sizes
Table 3 compares the bandwidth (in MB/sec) of writing to a ﬁle of 16M size using
various block sizes for both Kaﬀe and Trishul JVMs. Note that here, as with the
AllObjectConstruct benchmark, no taints were introduced into the Trishul system.
The jMocha ﬁle operation benchmark results show that the maximum overhead
1 Compiled using conﬁg: ./conﬁgure –disable-gtk-peer –with-staticlib –with-staticbin –with-staticvm –with-
engine=intrp –disable-vmdebug CFLAGS=-O3
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introduced by Trishul is 7% which reduces to a very reasonable value of 0.4% for
large block sizes. This variation can be explained by the observation that when the
ﬁles are read/written in smaller block sizes, the loop that performs the read/write,
is executed more times and each time Trishul has to calculate the new branch taint
value at each CFI instance. These expensive operations introduce more overhead.
A similar result was observed for the FileReadBW benchmark test too.
5 Discussion
Performance Optimisation - Trishul is still in the early stages of development and
some of the performance numbers obtained in the previous section can probably
be improved by further optimisations. Overhead incurred during the creation of
the CFGs and similar static analysis performed just before execution time can be
cached across application runs by storing the calculated information (like the context
bitmaps) in a secure, integrity protected, manner. In a similar manner, the CFGs of
trusted core Java libraries used in Kaﬀe and Trishul, like GNU Classpath [10], could
be calculated in advance and stored securely and re-used each time they are needed.
A more eﬃcient static analysis could reduce the overhead further. For example, an
analysis of the branch blocks could reveal that the objects used for context taint
calculations are never written into and hence their security class never change within
the branch block. This information can then be used to skip the repeated context
taint calculations performed when backward branch loops are encountered.
We are also in the process of implementing a JIT version of the system, which
should oﬀer more realistic performance.
Policy Engine - The Trishul architecture proposed here does not use a speciﬁc
built-in security policy model. Rather the modular nature of the policy engine
architecture allows the system to use policy engines provided by various third par-
ties. In doing so, the architecture can not only support various policy expression
languages but also policy semantics.
Native Methods - Java applications are able to invoke native methods directly using
the JNI. Once invoked, the native methods are no longer run within the JVM and
can, among other things, use registers inside the native processor and allocate mem-
ory on native stacks. There is no way for the IFC system to track the information
ﬂow within these methods. In order to avoid this, Trishul assumes that only trusted
native method libraries are allowed to be accessed by Java applications. As a part
of the post-build process, the hash of every trusted native library is stored within
the JVM. At run-time, these hashes are checked to ensure that the libraries have
not been replaced with untrusted ones and only native methods provided by these
libraries are allowed to be invoked.
6 Related Work
While some of the solutions proposed [11,12] to the problem of information ﬂow
tracing do not work in practice because they rely on using CFI instruction in a very
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restricted impractical manner, others [13] works only if the security classes have an
explicit notion of high and low, which is not always the case.
Denning [14] proposed a compile-time approach to solving the implicit informa-
tion ﬂow problem whereby the compiler adds extra instructions so that irrespective
of whether the CFI branch is followed or not, the class of object acted upon within
the branch is updated to reﬂect the information ﬂow. Other than compile-time
associated restrictions discussed earlier on, the proposed architecture was purely
theoretical in nature and also depended on the use of specialised ‘tagging’ sup-
ported hardware for supporting dynamic binding.
Fenton’s Data Mark Machine [3] was one of the earliest systems that used the
concept of run-time information ﬂow control to enforce policies. However the ma-
chine was an abstract concept and no implementation was ever attempted. The
RIFLE architecture [15] is a more recent system that implemented run-time infor-
mation ﬂow security with the aim of providing policy decision choice to the end
user. They uses a combination of program binary translation and a hardware ar-
chitecture modiﬁed speciﬁcally to aid information ﬂow tracking, the use of which
prevents it from being used on a normal machine. Beres and Dalton [16] used a dy-
namic instruction stream modiﬁcation framework to dynamically rewrite machine
code in order to support dynamic label binding. However the system not only ig-
nored implicit information ﬂows but also relied on enhanced hardware to perform
the run-time tracing.
Chandra [17] pursues a hybrid approach similar to that used by Trishul but by
instrumenting the bytecode with taint propagation code. However our exception
handling is more thorough and more eﬀective at handling control ﬂow attacks.
Their work also does not consider the risks posed by native function in any great
detail. Trishul treats labels as bitmaps, whereas Chandra treats them as integers.
Our approach allows more ﬂexible representation and manipulation of the labels by
the policy engine. By using an external instrumentation process their system also
relies of a bigger trusted computing bases for the accurate working of their system.
Haldar et al. use similar instrumentation approach in order to enforce security
policies [18]. However, the approach uses a much less accurate analysis of implicit
ﬂows and exceptions as well as support only a very coarse granularity for tainted
objects.
Inlined reference monitors (IRMs) [19] use an hybrid reference monitor with
post-compile time (but not strictly run-time) code rewriting approach to the prob-
lem of high-level policy enforcement. However, Schneider has shown that infor-
mation ﬂow, not being a safety property is not enforceable by the use of reference
monitors [20]. Because of this inability to trace information ﬂow within the system,
in order to enforce a ﬁne grained policy like ‘do not allow data accessed from /secret
to be sent over the network,’ IRMs have to resort to enforcing a coarser policy like
‘do not allow data accessed from anywhere within the local ﬁle system to be sent
over the network.’
Newsome and Song [21], among others, use the concept of tainting to track un-
trusted data from potentially unsafe input channels, like networks. If these data
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are used to perform dangerous operations, a ﬂag is raised and execution is halted.
But to extend the work to perform general policy enforcement would require con-
sidering implicit ﬂows, which is currently omitted. JFlow [22] is one of the modern
compile-time system, that uses type-based static analysis to track information ﬂow
in Java. At compile time, a special compiler uses the programmer speciﬁed labels
associated with objects to verify the information security model of the system. Once
this has been veriﬁed, the code is translated to normal Java code and a normal Java
compiler transforms it into bytecode.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we described the design and implementation of Trishul, a JVM based
information ﬂow tracing system. Trishul tackles the information ﬂow tracing prob-
lem by using a hybrid approach by performing static and dynamic analysis of the
Java bytecode. Trishul is able to perform taint tracing at the granularity of Java
member ﬁelds, thus providing a very ﬂexible architecture for data-oriented policy
enforcement framework.
Performance measurements using Trishul show that the system incurs limited
overhead. Optimisation needed to reduce this, some of which have been outlined in
the paper, form part of our future work. The information ﬂow tracing mechanism
described in this paper forms one of the core component of Trishul system archi-
tecture. We are in the process of implementing the pluggable policy engine module
section as well as a language for the policy engine writer to develop these policy
engines.
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